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Introduction 
This paper briefly reviews the published reports and papers of the 
Public Service Reform Commission (PSRC) , focusing on the 
premises and principles of the key recommendations. It places the 
Commission's work in the perspective of local administrative 
development, commenting on the extent to which the exercise 
differs from established patterns of reform. 
The paper is not meant as a critique of the Commission's reports. 
That is the task undertaken elsewhere in this publication. This 
paper effectively provides the backdrop to such criticism as well 
as to the proceedings of a public forum organised expressly to 
deliberate the PSRC report implications. 
A Historical Sketch 
The shortcomings of the public service are never far from public 
consciousness. They weigh heavily on the mind of political parties 
in opposition, which invariably promise to reform the 
administrative services as soon as they are returned to power. An 
incumbent Administration, no less anxious about the performance 
of its civil service, makes the same promises. Rather more 
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cynically, though few elections are fought over the public service, 
canny governments bear in mind that public employees and their 
dependents form by far the largest constituency. 
Electoral manifestos become the mandate of the victorious party, 
especially if it has spent an extended term on the Opposition 
benches. It is no coincidence that changes of administration are 
generally accompanied by major reviews of a nation's public 
service, most evidently in countries belonging to the Westminster 
tradition, where few of the high-ranking civil service positions 
change hands with a new Administration. 
The pattern is clearly discernible in Malta throughout the post-war 
period. Another factor - constitutional development - also seems 
to precipitate reviews of the public service. Thus, in 1944 and 
1946, on the threshold of the restoration of Self-Government, an 
Anomalies Commi ttee and a Salaries Revision Commi ttee reviewed 
civil service salaries, wages and related matters(1). In 1956, shortly 
after the Labour Party took office, a Civil Service Commission was 
established to review pay, recruitment, grading and conditions of 
service, as well as facilities available to non-industrial employees 
for joint consultation(2). Between 1959 and 1961, critical pre-
independence years, the Elwood Reforms were carried out(3). In 
1967, a Nationalist Government enjoying its first post-
independence electoral victory established the Salaries (Anomalies) 
Commission(4). In 1971, only two months after being returned to 
office, the Labour Government established the Commission for the 
Reorganization of the Public Service with very extensive terms of 
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reference and a numerous membership(5). The Commission was 
disbanaed shortly after, without completing its work, and the 
reorganization resumed in 1974 as, essentially, a collective 
bargaining exercise only concluded in 1981 (6). 
In all of these reviews, the terms of reference clearly emphasised 
pay, grading and conditions of service. Changes to departmental 
structures and procedures were generally undertaken following 
organization and methods studies carried out by officers of the 
Efficiency Development Branch at the Office of the Prime 
Minister. 
The PSRC: A Departure from the Pattern 
In May 1988, a year after taking office, the Nationalist 
Administration established the Public Service Reform Commission. 
In several significant respects, the Reform Commission departed 
from the pattern established by earlier reviews of the public 
service. 
In the first place, the re<rsons prompting the review were more 
urgent and more critical than had previously been the case. The 
Commission carried out the first major review of the public 
service in fifteen years. During that time, the Service had seen its 
prestige as a governing institution and as an employer decline. In 
spite of its remarkable record in assuming ever greater 
administrative responsibilities, the public at large, and especially 
the industrial and commercial communities, were dissatisfied with 
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its performance. The incoming Administration had made official 
corruption and administrative abuse one of the principal electoral 
issues(7): it courted the widespread perception that the public 
service had become politicised. The civil service itself was 
. demoralised, and had steadily been losing staff with managerial 
expertise as its salaries slipped behind those of the private 
sector(8). 
Secondly, the Commission's terms of reference did not focus on 
pay, grading and conditions of service for the public workforce: 
the key direction was "to examine the organization of the public 
service". This also differed from the brief given to the Commission 
for the Reorganization of the Civil Service in 1971, which was 
directed, among other things, "to examine the requirements of the 
country, and to see how these can be met administratively by the 
public service .... " The PSRC's brief is more future-oriented and, 
for the first time, introduces the idea of change - rather than 
continuity - as a goal of administrative reform: " .... and to 
recommend means by which the Service can efficiently respond to 
the changing needs for effective government". 
In the prevailing climate of mistrust, it was perhaps inevitable that 
Government should not only establish the Public Service Reform 
Commission, but also broaden its terms of reference beyond pay 
and grading. The breadth of the terms of reference reflect, to some 
extent, the range of expectations about its task. Not all of them 
were easy to reconcile. 
12 
The composition of the Commission also reflects the orientation of 
its task. Three of its five members were trained as economists: two 
of these had occupied senior management positions in the private 
sector; the third was an academic. Two members spent the greater 
part of their careers as high-ranking civil servants. 
A third, novel feature of the exercise was the presence, side by 
side with the Commission, of an expatriate consultant seconded to 
the Maltese Government to carry out an Operations Review which 
examined, among other things, the governmental structures within 
which the public service operates, as well as management systems. 
The Review gave further 'depth' to the Commission's brief, and 
the two exercises together acquired a 'critical mass' that made it 
more difficult for policy makers and for the civil service to ignore 
them. 
The Commission was aware both of the prevailing views about the 
public service and of the diverse expectations regarding its task. It 
attempted to harness both to its task, by inviting written and oral 
submissions. In its own words, " ... Over one hundred submissions 
were received ... many of these were supplemented by informal 
meetings and interviews [covering major trade unions, interest 
groups and high-ranking civil servants]. These contacts .... have 
given individuals and groups an opportunity to participate in the 
exercise"(9). The Commission's deference to the expectations of an 
increasingly participative society also marks a change from 
traditional patterns, though it must be acknowledged that a 
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commission is not suited to carrying out a broad-ranging and on-
going communications exercise. 
Finally, the Commission's exercise is noteworthy for the rapidity 
with which it was concluded: it spanned nineteen months, from 
June 1988 to February 1990. The most visible outcomes of its work 
are two reports bearing the same title: A New Public Service for 
Malta. The first deals with the organization of the public service; 
the second makes further proposals on administrative structures, 
grading, staff development, selection and compensation. Three 
supplementary papers presenting the results of studies undertaken 
by the Commission have also been published. Once again, both in 
content and in style, the Commission's reports depart from the 
patterns of the past. 
Premises of the Commission's Proposals 
In O'fder to place the Commission's recommendations in the right 
perspective, it is necessary to understand the premises on which 
they are based. A reading of the first stage report points to five 
such premises. 
Firstly, the public service is conceived as an institution, not merely 
as an organization or a passive component of the 'machinery of 
government'. Therefore, the effort to bring about change must be 
directed at structures, operating systems and the institutional 
culture, i.e. values, norms, attitudes and aspirations. 
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Secondly, the present difficulties are seen to be the result of 
complex causes and developments. Therefore, the needs of the 
Service cannot be met by 'orthodox' solutions that find their 
inspiration in the past. 
Thirdly, many players, in Government and outside, are associated 
with the Service and its activities. The players are generally in 
agreement about problems and their causes: it is therefore 
necessary to secure their support for the changes that are proposed, 
for which purpose they must understand the plans and participate 
in implementation. 
Fourthly, lasting change depends on the establishment of a climate 
of trust; that rests on a commonly accepted framework of rules and 
the assurance of efficacious action if that trust is betrayed. 
Finally, the capacity of the public service depends critically on the 
quality of its human resources and, in particular, on the leadership 
within its ranks; it depends on the investment in skills, ability, and 
expertise; and on the reward of merit. 
This last premise is clearly evident throughout the report: in fact, 
it might be said to constitute the principal theme. The Commission 
was particularly concerned with the leadership of the public 
service, addressing the report "to the men and women who have 
chosen public service as their calling and upon whose ability, 
dedication and leadership the outcome of this exercise so largely 
depends"(lO). 
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The First Stage Report 
Given these premises, the Commission identified two over-arching 
objectives, these being the restoration of the institutional fabric of 
the public service and building its organizational capacity. The 
Commission also underscored the need to safeguard the rights of 
employees, yet another theme underlying the report. 
The first stage report opens with a brief statement of 'findings' in 
which four decades of developments in government and 
administration are sketched out in broad brushstrokes. They lead 
to a terse diagnosis of the state of the public service and a shortlist 
of priority issues. The report "seeks here to focus only on what is 
essential, and to set the stage for identification of goals and 
strategies that address these issues"(1 i). 
The remainder of the report is almost entirely prescriptive, being 
constructed around a framework of eleven inter-related goals. 
In order to 'restore the institutional fabric', the Commission set the 
following goals: 
Goal One: Win public confidence in the service 
Goal Two: Create a culture of excellence and integrity 
Goal Three: Define the role of the public service. 
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In proposing strategies for attaining these goals, the Commission 
enunciated three important principles concerning the role and 
organization of the public service. 
The first is that the activity, resources and development of the 
career public service should be focused temporarily on the areas of 
its greatest strengths - the delivery of services - with external 
expertise grafted on the organization to perform other roles such 
as planning and policy analysis until such time as the Service 
developed planning and analytical capabilities(12). 
The second principle is that departments should be organised for 
tasks and be described in terms of 'positions', a position being the 
locus of responsibility for the performance of a task or tasks(13). 
This observation is so obvious as to seem almost trite, but it 
illustrates the extent to which the public service has lost structure 
and order. 
The third principle is that the roles of central agencies and line 
departments should be redefined: line managers should be 
delegated authority to plan work schedules, to spend within 
approved estimates and, most significantly, to select, assign, 
reward and discipline staff; the central agencies would establish 
operating standards and rules, and build the operating capacity of 
the line departments(14). This constitutes, in effect, a reversal of 
the present management philosophy, which assigns extensive 
controlling powers to the Ministry of Finance and to 
Establishments (now Management & Personnel Office). 
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In order to build organizational capacity, the following five goals 
are identified: 
Goal Five: 
Goal Six: 
Goal Seven: 
Goal Eight: 
Goal Nine: 
Define and develop employee competence 
Select and retain the brightest and ablest 
Improve the quality of management 
Invest in technology and plant 
Increase planning and audit capabilities 
The remaining two goals are more generic: 
Goal Ten: Define and contain executive discretion 
Goal Eleven: Institutionalise change. 
Proposals relating to human resource management account for the 
greatest share of this part of the report. 
The framework for human resource management would be 
provided by a new classification system comprising 'categories' 
which define broad levels of skill and competence, and 'classes', 
which identify occupational groups(15). 
Perhaps the greatest changes proposed concern the selection and 
appointment of public officers: these recommendations are the 
ones which have aroused most public comment and, almost 
certainly, some concern within the public service itself. The 
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essential principles in the recommendations concerning 
appointments can be stated as follows. 
Firstly, appointments should be made by the managers who assume 
responsibility for the performance of staff(16). The Commission 
acknowledged two limitations of this principle, namely, the need 
to avoid excessive departmentalism and the need to take advantage 
of economies of scale, both of which justified a measure of central 
intervention in the appointments process(17). 
Secondly, selection decisions should meet the needs of the 
organization by matching candidates with jobs. The Commission 
proposed that the criteria for selection should be relevant to the 
nature and the requirements of the job, and that selection exercises 
should find their context in annual manpower plans(l8). 
Thirdly, managers should be accountable for selection decisions 
before an impartial tribunal which would have effective powers to 
scrutinise such decisions and to initiate appropriate follow-up 
action(19). 
Finally, the rights of candidates for all positions should be 
safeguarded by means of an effective appeals procedure(20). The 
Commission acknowledged that this principle should be limited by 
the need to avoid spurious complaints or paralysis of appointments 
procedures(21 ). 
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The Commission extended the principle of competition to the 
highest management positions, recommending the appointment of 
'persons with a proven track record of management in the private 
sectof. .. to fill key management positions for which there are no 
comparable candidates in the public service'(22). The Commission 
further recommended that 'Category A' officers from the career 
track should retain tenure in a grade, rather than in the positions 
to which they are appointed. Initially, career officers promoted to 
Category A positions classified in Scales 1 to 4 would retain tenure 
in the grade of Assistant Director. Career officers who perform 
consistently well at levels above the grade of Assistant Director 
would be granted tenure in the higher grades(23). 
The removal of rigid central control would be counterbalanced by 
increased planning and audit capabilities in the central personnel 
and financial management agencies, in the departments, in the 
Public Service Commission and the Department of Audit. The 
central agencies should put up a framework of operating standards 
and reporting systems, and the scrutinising agencies should be 
given enhanced capacity for action, including initiation of 
investigations and imposing sanctions against defaulters (24). 
With each set of proposals, the Commission identified the key 
player/s who would assume responsibility for taking the public 
service towards the relevant goal, but, in general, the first report 
does not dwell on implementation. 
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The Second Stage Report 
In February 1990, the Commission presented its second-stage and 
final report to Government, the main purpose of the report being 
that of taking Government to the threshold of decision and action 
on the agenda proposed in the first. The report was premised on 
acceptance of the principles and proposals enunciated in the first 
stage report(25). 
The report elaborates proposals relating to five key aspects of 
human resource management, namely, administrative structures, 
grading, staff development, selection and compensation. The 
report also contains an implementation plan which synthesises the 
fundamental issues on which decisions are required, and links 
implementation of the Commission's proposals with 
complementary changes recommended by the Operations Review. 
The second report reflects the Commission's concern about the 
structural impediments to change and the safeguards required to 
ensure that implementation is consistent with the Commission's 
intent and with the real needs of the public service. The main 
proposal in each chapter is framed so as to facilitate 
implementation of corresponding proposals in the first report. 
Thus, for example, Chapter One - Human Resource Management: 
The Organizational Framework outlines political and 
administrative roles in the change process, including those of the 
Prime Minister, the Public Service Commission, the Management 
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and Personnel Office, the Management Systems Unit and the Staff 
Development Organization. 
Though essential, the second stage report is clearly subordinate to 
the first. The 'grand strategy' for change is mapped out in the first: 
the second takes the strategy closer to its realization. 
Supplementary Papers 
Both reports are deliberately stripped of lengthy analysis and 
argumentation: a terse statement of the issues is followed by an 
equally terse set of recommendations. This serves to focus the 
reader's attention on the merits of the ideas that are proposed, 
rather than to dwell on the litany of shortcomings deficiencies 
that are the stuff of any diagnosis. 
In order to compensate for the terseness, particularly of the first 
stage report, the Commission produced a select collection of three 
papers "that are a sample of the studies undertaken by the 
[Commission's] working parties .... They are being released in order 
to provide an understanding of facts, data and ideas which helped 
shape its thoughts on the future of the Service"(26). 
The first paper is a brief synthesis of the written and oral 
submissions which were made to the Commission. The second is a 
study of the growth of the public service during the years since 
Independence. The third paper is a report on a survey of General 
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Service officers in the grades of Assistant Head of Department and 
Administrative Officer. 
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